Introduction
The purpose of this article is to analyse the decision in Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel against the background of the previous jurisprudence regarding exemption clauses, 1 including the position of exemption clauses in a new constitutional dispensation. 2 In general, exemption clauses are binding and enforceable where the clause is clear and unambiguous, 3 and the court must give effect to the exemption clause even if its consequences are harsh. 4 In principle, public policy requires courts to give effect to the intention of the parties by enforcing the clause. Exemption clauses are, however, unenforceable if the clause is against public policy or if it is unusual in such an agreement.
When a dispute arises regarding the enforcement of a contract, the caveat subscriptor rule is applied first and a party is thus bound by the terms of the agreement by virtue of his signature. 5 Where the exemption clause is unusual or unexpected and the attention of the other party was not drawn to the clause, the iustus error doctrine has been relied upon by litigants in order to escape liability. 6 This doctrine is invoked in cases where the contract assertor had a legal duty to  Yeukai Mupangavanhu. LLB (UFH) LLM LLD (UWC) Lecturer, University of the Western Cape. Email: ychandaengerwa@uwc.ac.za.
on the premise that Birchwood Hotel had been negligent and that it could have prevented the harm from occurring.
Birchwood Hotel relied on disclaimers and exemption clauses which were on the back of the hotel register. The question before the Court was whether such disclaimers were displayed at the time, and whether the disclaimer or exemption clauses exempted Birchwood Hotel from liability for any damages that Naidoo suffered. Clause 5 of the registration card stated:
The guest hereby agrees on behalf of himself and the members of his party that it is a condition of his/their occupation of the Hotel that the Hotel shall not be responsible for any injury to, or death of any person or the loss or destruction of or damage to any property on the premises, whether arising from fire, theft or any cause, and by whomsoever caused or arising from the negligence (gross or otherwise) or wrongful acts of any person in the employment of the Hotel.
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Naidoo did not refute the fact that he had not read the "Terms and Conditions" even after seeing the instruction: "Please read terms and conditions on reverse!" 12 It was also not disputed that Naidoo was aware that standard contracts contained such clauses and that he was bound by the terms contained therein.
13

Decision
In determining whether or not Birchwood Hotel was liable for damages, the Court referred to the test for negligence, that is, whether the conduct complained of fell short of the standard of care required of a reasonable person. 14 Liability arises if the 9 Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) para 3. have taken steps to guard against such an occurrence. 15 The Court found that the security guard had failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the accident by warning Naidoo to keep at a distance. The Court held that reasonable steps on the part of Birchwood Hotel would entail regular checks to ensure that every gate was well maintained and functioning properly at all times. If the gate was not functioning well, Birchwood Hotel should have warned the public of the potential danger posed by the gate. 16 It was contended that replacing the heavy gate with a new lighter gate was a precautionary measure which Birchwood Hotel took. The act of replacing the old gate indicated that reasonable steps could have been taken earlier to prevent the harm. 17 It was further held that Naidoo had discharged his onus of proving that the standard of care of Birchwood Hotel fell short of that required of a reasonable person. The Court also found that Naidoo had played no part in causing the harm and that there was no contributory negligence. Birchwood Hotel was therefore one hundred percent liable for the damages.
18
The Court also had to determine if the exemption clause was binding on Naidoo and if it was not against public policy. The facts in Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 1 SA 982 (SCA) were that the first respondent and her daughter were flung from a jet ride in an amusement park. Subsequent investigation revealed that there had been a failure in the hydraulic system governing the vertical movement of the car in which they had been seated. The first and second respondent alleged negligence on the part of the appellant. The appellant, on the other hand, relied on disclaimer notices which were on the ticket windows. The questions before the Court were the following. First, whether a disclaimer contained in a notice painted on the windows of the ticket offices in the amusement park had been incorporated into the contract governing the use of the park's amenities. Second, whether on a proper construction of the notice the appellant was exempted from liability for negligence. Third, whether the appellant, as operator of the amusement park, had been negligent. The Court held that any reasonable person approaching the office in order to purchase a ticket could hardly have failed to observe the notices with their bold white-painted border on either side of the cashier's window. The existence of the notices containing the terms was not unusual for a reasonable patron. It was further held that the appellant had done whatever was necessary to bring the attention of the respondent to the notices and that the contract was concluded subject to the terms in the notices. Similarly, the respondents had framed their pleadings based on a delict. Although the respondents had attempted to sue based on delict, their claim failed on the basis that the notices were conspicuous. The appeal thus succeeded.
proferens. 42 The alternative meaning upon which reliance is placed to demonstrate the ambiguity must be one to which the language is fairly susceptible; it must not be fanciful or remote. 43 It is clear from the above approach that the ambiguity may be used to reduce the effect of an exemption clause on the contract denier in terms of the damages suffered. Courts therefore accept an interpretation unfavourable to the proferens because he had the opportunity to express himself more clearly. 44 The wording in an exemption clause, however, should be read with all the other terms of the contract. 45 The facts in Naidoo did not give rise to interpretation issues. Club's rules contained an exemption clause which included the following words:
The Club shall in no circumstances whatsoever be liable for any loss of or damage to the property of any member or guests brought onto the premises of the Club whether occasioned by theft or otherwise, nor shall the Club be held responsible or in any way liable for personal injury or harm however caused to members or their children or their guests on the Club premises and/or grounds.
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The approach to the interpretation of the above clause was a matter which the Court had to adjudicate. It had previously been stated that parties to a contract are taken to have intended their legal rights and obligations to be governed by the common law unless they have plainly and unambiguously indicated the contrary by including On the question of whether exemption clauses are compatible with constitutional values, and whether growth of the common law consistent with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights requires its adaptation, the Court stated:
It is arguable that to permit such exclusion would be against public policy because it runs counter to the high value the common law and, now, the Constitution place on the sanctity of life.
52
This court in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) left scope for such a conclusion.
53
In view of the above statement, it can be argued that an exemption clause may be against public policy and thus inconsistent with the Constitution. As to whether or not the enforcement of such clauses is fair in every circumstance, that is another issue. Whilst it is essential to recognise the doctrine of the sanctity of a contract, such clauses are valid subject to reasonableness and fairness, as pointed out in Barkhuizen v Napier.
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In essence, some exemption clauses may not be constitutional on the basis that they are unfair and unjust. 
Principles of justice, reasonableness and fairness
Principles of justice, reasonableness and fairness constitute constitutional standards or values that must be taken into account when enforcing an agreement. These concepts, however, are elusive. The extent to which courts may set aside a contract based on these principles is not clear. Nicholls J refused to uphold the exemption clause in Naidoo on the basis that its enforcement would not be just and fair in the circumstances. The issue that arises is whether Nicholls J's reliance on these principles can find support.
Reasonableness and fairness do not at the moment qualify as free-standing requirements of our law of contract. 56 These principles are still regarded as abstract values and they do not amount to substantive rules that courts can "employ to intervene in contractual matters". 57 These principles as a result cannot be acted upon by the courts directly. The rationale for this is based on the notion that if judges are allowed to refuse to enforce a contractual provision simply because it offends their personal sense of fairness and justice, it will result in legal and commercial uncertainty. Brand J strongly argues that endorsing the notion that judges may decide cases on the basis of what they regard as reasonable and fair will give rise to "intolerable legal uncertainty". 58 This is because a sense of what is equitable and fair is so subjective that the outcome in any given case will consequently depend on the personal idiosyncrasies of the individual judge. A clause accordingly cannot be declared invalid merely because it offends the sense of the individual judge. 59 If judges are allowed to decide cases on the basis of what they regard as reasonable and fair, the criterion will no longer be law but the judge.
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Allowing the criterion to be judge-based would establish an untenable position in our legal system. This may have an impact on the rule of law. The CPA further provides that the certain notices or provisions must be drawn to the attention of the consumer in a manner and form that satisfies the requirements of section 49(3)-(5). These are notices or provisions that limit in any way the risk or liability of the supplier or any other person, 74 or any provision that purports to constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer, 75 or any provision that purports to impose an obligation on the consumer to indemnify the supplier or any other person for any cause, 76 or any clause that purports to be an acknowledgement of any fact by the consumer.
77
Section 58 must be read together with section 49 as it requires the supplier of certain intrinsically risky facilities or activities to alert the consumer to the fact, nature and potential effect of the risk in a manner that meets the standards set out in section 49. 78 Van Eeden argues that the totality of the phrase "fact, nature and potential effect" clearly indicates that the supplier is required to ensure that the consumer has an adequate understanding and appreciation of the risk rather than a superficial awareness of the risk. 79 Section 49(5) of the CPA provides that the consumer must be given an adequate opportunity "to receive and comprehend the provision or notice". 80 The purpose is to allow the consumer to make an informed decision. This reinforces the principle that the consumer must read and understand 
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S 58 of the CPA provides: "The supplier of any activity or facility that is subject to any-(a) risk of an unusual character or nature; (b) risk of which a consumer could not reasonably be expected to be aware, or which an ordinarily alert consumer could not reasonably be expected to contemplate, in the circumstances; or (c) risk that could result in serious injury or death must specifically draw the fact, nature and potential effect of that risk to the attention of consumers in a form and manner that meets the standards set out in section 49." Whilst it is important to ensure that consumers make an "informed choice", once their attention is drawn to the clause they are bound by the terms of the agreement including the exemption clause. The CPA does not afford consumers much protection as service providers are still able to use exemption clauses, but they should alert the consumers to their existence in a prescribed manner and form. 84 In the case of standard contracts where the consumer has to sign the contract on a "take-it-orleave-it" basis, the fact that the CPA requires the consumer to be aware of such clauses is of no help other than to exclude the liability of the service provider or supplier. It is submitted that Pretorius' argument is valid, that viewed from the perspective of contractual mistake, the CPA may in fact have a lesser impact on protecting consumers.
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The implication of an "informed decision" is that the contract denier cannot rely on reasonable mistake. Courts have in some instances managed to refuse to enforce exemption clauses on the basis of the contract assertor's failure to draw the attention of the other party to the clause, which translates into a failure of reasonable reliance on the part of the contract assertor. 86 A consumer may now thus not rely on the iustus error doctrine where he was aware of the existence of an exemption clause in the agreement. From the above discussion it is apparent that 81 Webber Wentzel Dispute Resolution Department 2012 http://www.sabinetlaw.co.za/economicaffairs/articles/consumer-protection-bill-and-informed-choice.
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The requirement that the existence of all exemption clauses should be drawn to the attention of the consumer may be a double-edged sword in that the assertor may rely on the fact that the denier assented to the provision and is therefore bound: 88 where the plaintiff was participating in an activity known as the Kempton Corporate Adventure Race when she fell from a zip-wire affixed to the top of a scaffold platform and sustained injuries. The plaintiff had signed an indemnity form. The issue before the Court was whether the defendants were indemnified from liability by virtue of her having signed the indemnity document, or whether the defendants were indemnified only in the event of its being found that stringent safety measures had in fact been put in place for the adventure race. The Court held that the defendants would be indemnified against any claims provided that stringent safety measures were in place. In the event that the defendants failed to ensure that such safety measures were in place, the indemnity would not be operative. It was held that the indemnity provided by the plaintiff was conditional upon its being established that the defendants had done all things reasonably necessary to ensure the safety of the participants. The Court found that the defendants had failed to do so. The case was thus decided in favour of the plaintiff. Taking part in an adventure race was a risky activity compared to the activity of Naidoo, who had booked a stay at a hotel. A hotel is a public place and it has to ensure that its customers are safe, in the same way as a hospital is reasonably expected to provide quality services by ensuring that patients are treated in a professional manner and in accordance with professional standards that do not cause harm. 89 This view is based on the principle of reasonable expectations. The law should be more willing to protect the reasonable expectations of parties and should give them legal force. 90 The principle is not foreign to the law of contract as the reasonable expectations of a negotiating party within the context of mistake are protected. 91 A guest at a hotel does not expect any danger and will only assent to a risk which is reasonably foreseen. In a situation where a gate falls on a guest, resulting in serious injuries, the reasonable expectations principle could be used to justify the non-enforcement of an exemption clause.
The question that springs to mind is: what happens in situations where the attention of the consumer was drawn to an unfair term before the conclusion of the contract?
It is submitted that in instances where a term that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust was drawn to the consumer's attention in the prescribed manner and form, the court may refuse to enforce it on the basis that it is unfair. 92 This is so because it is not sufficient for the attention of the consumer to be drawn to the unfair term in order to achieve an informed decision. 93 The critical issue is whether or not the term qualifies as unfair and thus is prohibited in terms of the CPA. The fact that the term was drawn to the consumer's attention should not be allowed to prejudice him, as in most cases consumers are left with no option but to sign the document. Accordingly, a court can strike down an exemption clause on the basis of unfairness.
Regulation 44(3)(a) of the CPA "greylists" clauses excluding liability for bodily injury or death caused negligently. It provides that a term of a consumer agreement is "presumed" to be unfair if it has the purpose or effect of "excluding or limiting the liability of the supplier for death or personal injury caused to the consumer through an act or omission of that supplier…" The word "presumed" suggests that the unfairness may be rebutted. This explanation is consistent with "greylisting", which means that such a clause "must at the very least be included in an indicative list of clauses which may be regarded as unfair, whereas the supplier may still persuade a court otherwise". 98 Whether a clause excluding the liability of the supplier for death or personal injury caused to the consumer is unfair or not depends on the circumstances of each case. In Naidoo the clause was regarded as unfair. matter. 100 The explicit prohibition of agreements, terms or conditions that exclude liability in cases of gross negligence implies that ordinary negligence is not covered.
Thus, the CPA does not ban exemption clauses per se. However, exemption clauses which are unfair or unreasonable are invalid. Although the CPA explains the meaning of "unfair, unreasonable or unjust" in section 48(2), phrases such as "so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable" are not defined. The exact meaning of "inequitable" is thus left to the determination of the court. It is argued that the above provisions must be interpreted in a purposive manner to ensure that consumers are adequately protected. 101 It is further argued that section 51(1)(c) of the CPA should be amended to include a ban on exemption clauses that exclude liability for death or personal injury. The rationale for this is that an exclusion of liability for personal injuries or death is contrary to public policy. 102 The unlimited enforcement of an exemption clause excluding liability for death or personal injury cannot be tolerated and should thus be set aside. 103 It is undesirable to allow hospitals or hotels to become negligent. These are public places and they have a duty to provide a safe environment. It would have been unfair to uphold an exemption clause in the circumstances of Naidoo.
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Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 13. The facts of this case are that the respondent had been admitted to a private hospital owned by the appellant for an operation and post-operative medical treatment. The respondent had signed the admission document without reading it, and the document contained an exclusion of liability and an indemnity clause absolving the hospital and/or its employees or agents from all liability. The appellant sought to rely on this exemption clause and indemnity. The respondent did not dispute the fact that the receptionist had pointed out the space where he was supposed to sign but argued that he had not been directed to the exclusion of liability and indemnity. The respondent further argued that it was a tacit term of the agreement that the appellant's nursing staff would treat him in a professional manner and with reasonable care. After the operation, certain negligent conduct by a nurse led to complications resulting in the respondent suffering damages. The respondent argued that the conduct of the nurse constituted a breach of contract by the appellant and instituted an action against the appellant for the damages suffered. The Court held that the subjective expectations of the respondent were not relevant in determining if there was a legal duty on the appellant to alert respondent to the inclusion of the exclusion of liability and indemnity. The question was whether such clauses were unusual or not. The Court held that exclusions of liability and indemnities were the rule and not the exception in standard form contracts. It was accordingly found that there was no legal duty on the appellant to alert respondent to the terms of the contract and that the clause was not against public policy. There was also no evidence indicating that the respondent had indeed occupied a weaker bargaining position than the appellant during the conclusion of the contract.
Enforcement of exemption clauses
The decision in Naidoo appears to indicate that there are better chances of holding the other party liable in delict for harm suffered when there is concurrent liability in contract and delict.
104 Naidoo involved patrimonial loss which arose as a result of bodily harm. 105 The same set of facts could in principle give rise to both delictual and contractual remedies. 106 A claim in contract would arise based on the fact that the hotel owed its customers a duty of care to maintain its premises in a safe condition. 107 Naidoo thus could have alleged a breach of contract following the harm that was suffered as a result of the malfunctioning of the gate. The validity of the contract would have been considered in the light of public policy. 108 Considerations such as good faith and reasonableness would have been taken into account to determine the validity of the exemption clause. The plaintiff elected to sue in delict.
It appears that the standard of proof can easily be discharged in proving negligence, as against suing in terms of the law of contract, where Naidoo would have been required to prove that the exemption clause was unreasonable and thus against public policy. 109 To avoid the problematic nature of exemption clauses and the onus of proof required in terms of the law of contract, it is argued that plaintiffs should rather frame their pleadings based on delict in cases where there has been bodily harm or death. If the plaintiff sues in delict the onus of proving that the clause is reasonable would be on the supplier. 110 It is argued that an exemption clause does not result in one's contracting out of delictual liability. This is so because the gate could have fallen on anyone walking past it, and therefore the existence of the contract between Naidoo and the Birchwood Hotel was incidental.
Implications of the decision in Naidoo
The decision is a step in the right direction. It seeks to ameliorate the harm caused by exemption clauses which could be viewed as "unfair". It prevents reliance on such clauses. It would have been unfair and unjust to uphold the exemption clause in Naidoo. If the CPA had been applicable at the time, the Court would have relied on section 22 and section 49, and more importantly on section 48 and section 51 (1) of the Act.
It is significant to note that for a long period, fairness and reasonableness have been taken into consideration when setting aside a contract, but usually only in extreme cases. 111 Limiting issues of unfairness and unreasonableness to extreme cases of "unconscionability" seems to require change, as this is out of step with reality. There Generally courts appear to be wary when deciding whether or not to enforce contractual provisions on the basis that the agreement is unfair or unjust. 115 It can be construed that it is this restraint on the part of courts that seems still to favour the freedom of contract and the pacta sunt servanda principle over other principles such as fairness and reasonableness. 116 This seems to be the position despite the fact that in the new constitutional dispensation these principles must be applied in the light of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in accordance with section 39(2) of the Constitution.
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Exemption clauses are a "rule rather than an exception" in standard contracts, but the other party often does not have "real" freedom in relation to the terms of the contract since most of the terms are not subject to negotiation except perhaps as regards price, payment terms, delivery date and warranties. 118 The consumer is faced with a "take-it-or-leave-it" situation and is forced to accept the terms in a standard contract. 119 There is thus no freedom of contract in reality. The freedom is rather theoretical or formalistic. 120 Courts must take this factor into consideration where the defendant relies on disclaimer notices or exemption clauses to avoid liability.
Naidoo marks a significant stride towards fairness and equity in contracts. Freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda have usually prevailed over fairness. The importance of developing the law to ensure fairness has been long overdue. 
